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Note
A Monumental Task: How Should Courts Review
Challenges to Presidential Actions Taken
Pursuant to the Antiquities Act?
Bryan Mette
INTRODUCTION
FOR THE BENEFIT AND ENJOYMENT OF THE PEOPLE.1 This simple, yet powerful phrase adorning the Roosevelt
Arch—the gateway to Yellowstone National Park, America’s
first national park2—embodies the country’s beliefs about its
public lands. This ideal springs from the notion that our public
lands are owned in common by the people and for the people.
Consequently, an integral part of our public lands’ heritage is a
focus on conserving their beauty and splendor for future generations. To aid the goals of conservation and protection of unique
cultural, historic, scientific, and geographic sites throughout the
nation,3 Congress passed the Antiquities Act of 1906.4 This law
authorizes the President to designate certain sites on federally
owned lands as national monuments, provided they meet specific
statutory criteria.5 Presidents have certainly taken advantage of
 J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thank you
to the editors and staff members of the Minnesota Law Review whose diligent
efforts greatly improved this Note. Special thanks to my family, especially my
mother and father, whose support and devotion these past twenty-eight years
paved the way for me to be in the position I am today. I am forever indebted.
Finally, I dedicate this piece to past generations who had the foresight to preserve our national treasures for the countless generations to follow and to Roger
Wagner, the great Alaskan explorer. Copyright © 2019 by Bryan Mette.
1. See Courtney Holden, Roosevelt Arch at Yellowstone’s North Entrance,
YELLOWSTONEPARK.COM (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.yellowstonepark.com/
park/roosevelt-arch [https://perma.cc/X96J-V24K] (describing the arch and its
inscription).
2. Id.
3. See infra Part I.A.2.
4. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.
5. Id.
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this power, designating more than 158 national monuments
throughout every corner of the country.6
Despite our country’s strong legacy of protecting priceless
public lands, in late 2017, President Donald Trump significantly
reduced the boundaries of national monuments designated by
Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.7 These monuments—both located in Utah—were Grand Staircase-Escalante8
and Bears Ears.9 Although some parties supported this action,10
others rejected it and filed suit, claiming that by reducing previous monument designations, Trump exceeded his authority under the Antiquities Act.11 The primary conflict between the two
camps hinges on whether the Act’s delegation of the authority to
designate national monuments includes the power to reduce or
revoke a prior monument designation.12 The academic debate
over this question is fierce.13
Although this Note focuses on determining how courts
should review challenges to presidential monument actions generally, part of its inquiry necessarily includes how courts should

6. See Monuments List, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/
archeology/sites/antiquities/MonumentsList.htm
[https://perma.cc/57ZQ-FCH8].
7. Julie Turkewitz, Trump Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/
04/us/trump-bears-ears.html [https://perma.cc/SZT8-3K5U].
8. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017).
9. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017).
10. For example, the governor of Utah wrote an opinion piece backing the
reduction of Bears Ears. Gary Herbert, Gary Herbert: 5 Myths About Bears Ears,
DESERET NEWS (Dec. 4, 2017, 1:45 PM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/
865693641/Gary-Herbert-5-myths-about-Bears-Ears.html
[https://perma.cc/E8D9-DUBV].
11. At least five suits were quickly filed in response to Trump’s action. See
Andrew M. Harris, Patagonia Sues Trump over Bears Ears Monument, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 7, 2017, 10:38 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017
-12-07/apparel-maker-patagonia-sues-trump-over-bears-ears-monument
[https://perma.cc/VE7P-C6FA].
12. For an overview of the arguments concerning whether the President
lacks the power to reduce or revoke preexisting monuments, see Mark Squillace
et al., Presidents Lack the Authority To Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2017). But see John Yoo & Todd Gaziano,
Presidential Authority To Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations,
35 YALE J. ON REG. 617 (2018) (arguing in favor of the position that the President’s Antiquities Act powers also include the authority to reduce or revoke national monuments).
13. See supra note 12.
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review monument reductions or revocations.14 An important
question thus arises: Is the same deference given to the reduction or revocation of a monument as is given to the President’s
discretion with regard to designations?15 And if it is, should it
be? This inquiry is particularly timely, not only because of the
current litigation regarding Trump’s actions,16 but also because
of the other national monuments potentially on the chopping
block.17
Part I of this Note explores the history surrounding national
monument designations, including background on the Antiquities Act and how various Presidents have utilized the law. Part
I also examines the framework courts employ in reviewing executive actions that are allegedly at odds with Congress’s will. Part
II explores how some of the examples of presidential national
monument designations discussed in Part I sparked litigation
and how courts have failed to settle on a consistent standard of
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994) (finding that it is improper for the judiciary to review an action exercised by another branch when
discretion has been committed to that branch in regard to that action).
16. Thomas Burr, Judge Consolidates Lawsuits over Bears Ears, Grand
Staircase Monument Changes, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www
.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/01/31/judge-consolidates-lawsuits-over-bears
-ears-grand-staircase-monument-changes/ [https://perma.cc/K5U8-FF32] (noting that several lawsuits were filed in response to Trump’s reduction of Bears
Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante).
17. Exec. Order No. 13,792, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,429 (Apr. 26, 2017) (requiring
the Interior Secretary to “conduct a review of all Presidential designations or
expansions of designations under the Antiquities Act made since January 1,
1996, where the designation covers more than 100,000 acres, where the designation after expansion covers more than 100,000 acres, or where the Secretary
determines that the designation or expansion was made without adequate public outreach and coordination with relevant stakeholders”). This directive resulted in Secretary Ryan K. Zinke reviewing twenty-two national monuments
and five marine national monuments. See RYAN K. ZINKE, FINAL REPORT SUMMARIZING FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW OF DESIGNATIONS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES
ACT 5–6 (2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/revised_final_
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NPX8-3TW8]. Besides the Bears Ears and Grand
Staircase-Escalante reductions, Zinke expressed support for reducing other national monuments including Gold Butte in Nevada and Cascade-Siskiyou along
the Oregon-California border. Valerie Volcovici, Interior Secretary Urges Size
Cuts, Management Changes to More Monuments, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2017,
1:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-monuments/interior
-secretary-urges-size-cuts-management-changes-to-more-monumentsidUSKBN1DZ2SV [https://perma.cc/24XJ-J4RG]. Zinke also raised the prospect
of altering the boundaries of two marine national monuments located in the
Pacific Ocean: the Pacific Remote Islands and Rose Atoll. Id.
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review in these challenges. Part III concludes by proposing that
Congress should pass a statutory remedy to guide courts on how
to review a President’s discretionary action taken pursuant to
the Antiquities Act.
I. EXPLORING THE HISTORY OF NATIONAL MONUMENT
DESIGNATIONS
Beginning with the passage of the Antiquities Act, this Part
traces the evolution of the President’s designation power under
the Act by examining some of the most famous (and contentious)
presidential monument designations. This exercise demonstrates how various administrations, through increasingly bold
actions that tested the limits of Congress’s delegation, altered
conceptions of presidential power pursuant to the Act. It then
examines several cases—generally expounding upon presidential authority—that are relevant to the issues of executive power
arising under the Act.
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
This Section begins by providing a brief background on federal public lands law, including its constitutional underpinnings.
It also includes a description of what prompted the need for the
Antiquities Act. It then transitions to a brief discussion of the
legislative history and text of the Act.
1. The Property Clause
As a bedrock principle, the Framers imbued the Constitution with the separation of powers.18 A necessary component of
this ideal is that the three branches of government—the executive,19 judicial,20 and legislative21—are each assigned powers to
exercise. Among the multitude of powers granted to the various
18. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many . . . may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
19. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1–2 (granting the President the
power, among others, to act as commander in chief of the nation’s armed forces,
make treaties, and appoint Supreme Court justices).
20. See, e.g., id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing the Supreme Court to hear
cases and controversies involving the United States, ambassadors, and disputes
between states).
21. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress powers, including to impose
taxes, regulate interstate commerce, and establish post offices).
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branches, the Constitution authorized Congress “to dispose of
and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.”22 This
power—enumerated in what is colloquially called the Property
Clause—has been described as one “without limitations.”23 And
from this power flows Congress’s authority to pass laws relating
to lands the federal government owns and how those lands
should be administered.24
Initially, the impetus for assigning this power to the federal
government was borne out of debates occurring around the formation of the Constitution. Due to land-boundary disputes
among the original states and inadequacies for land disposition
present in the Articles of Confederation,25 the Framers intended
to grant Congress a broad power to set the rules for federally
owned public lands.26 Using this power, Congress has passed
laws dealing with various aspects of public lands for purposes
commonly associated with federal land policy, such as designating wilderness areas and national parks,27 formulating rules for
timber sales in national forests,28 and even protecting wild
horses and burros.29 As these examples demonstrate, the scope
22. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
23. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29
(1940).
24. See id. at 29–30.
25. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The
Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1, 18–19 (2001); see also id. at 27 (“Madison argued that a chief weakness of the
Articles stemmed from the lack of a power analogous to that conferred by the
Property Clause.”).
26. See id. at 26 (noting that the records of the Constitutional Convention
are unclear as to the extent of the power the Framers intended to bequeath to
Congress but that they likely intended for Congress to exercise “broad authority” in federal land policy and “not simply the power to dispose of federal property”).
27. See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2012) (allowing for the designation of wilderness areas); Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 42
Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 21 (2012)) (establishing Yellowstone
National Park).
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 472a(a).
29. See Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act of 1971, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1331–1340. Notably, a challenge to this act led the U.S. Supreme Court to
reiterate once more that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to
Congress is without limitations.” Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539
(1976) (quoting United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. at
29).
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of Congress’s public-lands power is wide-ranging. It is within
this authority that Congress relied on its broad powers under the
Property Clause to pass the Antiquities Act of 1906.30
2. The Need for the Antiquities Act
Prior to passage of the Antiquities Act, the looting, vandalism, and destruction of unique and important archaeological
sites was an acute problem—particularly in the southwestern
United States.31 Various proposals were put forth to protect precious national artifacts on federal lands.32 One such proposal,
authored by Congressman Jonathan Dolliver of Iowa in 1900,
authorized the President to withdraw public lands containing
culturally significant manmade artifacts, such as cave dwellings
and burial mounds, as well as “any natural formation of scientific or scenic value of interest, or natural wonder or curiosity.”33
Although this sweeping language was not adopted, it provided
the foundation for a bill proposed by Representative John Lacey
of Iowa later that year. It was this bill that included language
that was eventually incorporated into the Antiquities Act.34 In
particular, this language authorized the President to withdraw
lands to protect “objects of scientific or historic interest.”35
Several years later, on June 8, 1906, Congress passed this
language, along with a broad grant of authority to the President
to designate national monuments, in the Antiquities Act.36 Despite its sweeping language and large delegation of authority
from Congress to the President, the Act itself was surprisingly
short. Comprised of four sections, the Act laid out a scheme for
protecting public lands that contained unique cultural, historic,
and scientific objects.37 The first section provided for criminal
penalties applicable to any person found to “appropriate, exca30. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.
31. Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906,
37 GA. L. REV. 473, 477 (2003) (recounting how archaeologists wanted to protect
native artifacts by preventing the looting of these items from sites in the Southwest United States). For example, Squillace notes that sites like Chaco Canyon
in northwest New Mexico and Mesa Verde (now a national park) in southwest
Colorado were threatened by private collectors of cultural artifacts. Id.
32. Id. at 478–79.
33. Id. (quoting H.R. 8066, 56th Cong. (1900)).
34. See id. at 480 (citing H.R. 11,021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900)).
35. Id. (quoting H.R. 11,021, 58th Cong. § 1 (1900)).
36. Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.
37. Id.
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vate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States.”38 The third section included a provision permitting the excavation of
withdrawn sites for educational or scientific purposes if authorized by the agency in charge of managing the monument.39 The
fourth section authorized the agency head in charge of administering a national monument to engage in administrative rulemaking “for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the
Act.”40
However, it is the Act’s second section—providing the substantive delegation of power from Congress to the President—
that features prominently in this Note. In authorizing the President to withdraw federal lands, that section stated:
That the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by
the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper
care and management of the objects to be protected . . . .41

It is this seemingly innocuous language that sparked litigation as well as a robust academic debate regarding how Presidents have exercised their monument-designation power under
the Antiquities Act and what the limitations (if any) on that
power are.
3. Scope of the Antiquities Act
Congress passed the Antiquities Act in response to calls for
the protection of unique archaeological artifacts.42 And there is
good evidence that this was its primary purpose. During a debate
in the House of Representatives on the bill that became the Antiquities Act, its sponsor—Representative Lacey—responded to
questioning from a Texas Congressman who was concerned
about large land withdrawals akin to previous vast withdrawals
for forest reserves:

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Squillace, supra note 31, at 477–78.
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Representative Lacey: There has been an effort made to have national
parks in some of these regions, but this will merely make small reservations where the objects are of sufficient interest to preserve them.
Representative Stephens: Will that take this land off the market, or
can they still be settled on as part of the public domain?
Representative Lacey: It will take that portion of the reservation out of
the market. It is meant to cover the cave dwellers and cliff dwellers.
Representative Stephens: How much land will be taken off the market
in the Western States by the passage of the bill?
Representative Lacey: Not very much. The bill provides that it shall be
the smallest area necesstry [sic] for the care and maintenance of the
objects to be preserved.43

The exchange between the two seems to have enunciated
that the legislation was limited in scope in two ways: (1) in the
types of sites it was intended to protect and (2) in the size of national monuments themselves. Considering that the assurances
of restraint came from the bill’s sponsor, the House exchange
certainly provides ammunition for critics of presidential monument designations44 that the Act was never intended to provide
a basis for the wholesale withdrawal of millions of acres of federal lands. Instead, they argue, it was intended to be used in a
targeted fashion to protect discrete parcels of land.45
Notwithstanding this legislative history, the Act’s text must
be considered as well.46 Indeed, some members of the federal judiciary eschew legislative history in analyzing a statute due to a
43. 40 CONG. REC. 7888 (June 5, 1906). Titles of the representatives have
been modified to improve readability.
44. CAROL HARDY VINCENT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41330, NATIONAL
MONUMENTS AND THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 5 (2016) (“[Critics] charge that Congress intended the act to protect specific items of interest, especially archaeological sites and the small areas surrounding them.”). But see id. (“Defenders
observe that by not specifically capping the size of monument designations, the
Antiquities Act gives the President discretion to determine the acreage necessary to ensure protection of the resources in question, which can be a particular
archaeological site or larger features or resources.”).
45. See Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 12, at 625 (“[T]he Antiquities Act’s title,
drafting history, and historical context provide powerful additional evidence
that the Act was not intended to allow vast scenic or geological monuments.”);
cf. NICOLAS D. LORIS, HERITAGE FOUND., THE ANTIQUATED ACT: TIME TO REPEAL THE ANTIQUITIES ACT 2 (2015) (calling for the repeal of the Antiquities Act
and noting that Presidents have withdrawn millions of acres for national monuments despite language in the Act calling for designations to be limited to the
“smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected”).
46. As Justice Kagan has remarked, “I think we’re all textualists now.”
Harvard Law Sch., The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the
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purported lack of reliability.47 It is notable that the enacted law
did not include discrete limitations on monument size despite
calls for such restrictions.48 Rather than limit the Act’s scope to
the withdrawal of small parcels of land to protect particular archaeological artifacts, the Act’s actual text is an open-ended
grant of authority reflective of Congress’s desire to provide the
President the flexibility needed to protect our national treasures—whether they be historic or scientific, man-made or natural.49 Scholars who have studied this law in great detail have
come to a similar conclusion.50
B. HOW HAVE PRESIDENTS ACTUALLY UTILIZED THEIR
DESIGNATION POWERS UNDER THE ANTIQUITIES ACT?
Regardless of what Congress’s original conception of the Antiquities Act was, it is clear that Presidents have utilized this
law to designate national monuments on a grand scale. Except
for Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, every
President since Theodore Roosevelt (who signed the original bill
into law) has utilized the Act to designate monuments of varying
sizes with differing rationales for their designations.51

Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg.
47. See Christine A. Klein, Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the
Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333, 1342 n.45 (2002) (noting that some
Supreme Court justices, like Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia, have
been skeptical of using legislative history in interpreting a statute).
48. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 483. Although earlier bills contained
explicit size limits (such as 320 or 640 acres) on national monument designations, the Act did not hem in the President’s authority to withdraw lands but
instead included more general language that introduced an element of discretion in the scope of withdrawals. That language required withdrawals to be “the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected.” Id.
49. See id. at 486 (“Legislative history and congressional intent aside, the
plain language of the Antiquities Act supports a broad construction of the President’s authority to protect large tracts of land. The plain language of the Act,
more than any legislative history, is likely to ensure judicial support for Antiquities Act proclamations that protect large landscapes arguably relevant to science and history.”).
50. Id.
51. VINCENT, supra note 44, at 2 n.11. In 2018, Trump designated his first
national monument. Proclamation No. 9811, 83 Fed. Reg. 54,845 (Oct. 31, 2018)
(Camp Nelson National Monument).
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As the President who signed the Antiquities Act into law,
Theodore Roosevelt quickly imprinted his larger-than-life personality52 onto the process for designating national monuments.
Roosevelt designated America’s first national monument on September 24, 1906—Devil’s Tower National Monument in Crook
County, Wyoming.53 The proclamation announcing this new
monument was relatively short. It began with a brief recitation
of section two of the Act as well as the rationale for designation.54
This rationale described how Devil’s Tower had unique geological features, which consequently made it “an object of historic
and great scientific interest.”55 The proclamation then demarcated the site’s boundaries and barred unauthorized persons
from looting or otherwise destroying any natural feature of the
monument and settling on the land.56 The monument was
slightly smaller than 1,200 acres.57
Including Devil’s Tower, Roosevelt established eighteen national monuments in total, with Congress eventually incorporating several into national parks.58 However, it was the designation of one monument in particular that redefined the scope of

52. Overcome with grief after the death of his wife and mother on the same
day, Roosevelt subsequently took up ranching in the Badlands of western North
Dakota. Theodore Roosevelt the Rancher, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps
.gov/thro/learn/historyculture/theodore-roosevelt-the-rancher.htm [https://
perma.cc/JM7L-KT62]. Battling the harsh environment of this country, he
founded two ranches and lived out his idea of the “strenuous life.” Id. For an
account of Roosevelt’s vision of the strenuous life, see THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
The Strenuous Life: Speech Before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 10, 1899,
in THE STRENUOUS LIFE 3, 21–22 (1901), https://www.bartleby.com/58/1.html
[https://perma.cc/3T8T-EHX3] (“I preach to you, then, my countrymen, that our
country calls not for the life of ease but for the life of strenuous endeavor . . . . Above all, let us shrink from no strife, moral or physical, within or
without the nation, provided we are certain that the strife is justified, for it is
only through strife, through hard and dangerous endeavor, that we shall ultimately win the goal of true national greatness.”). The area where his ranches
once stood is now home to Theodore Roosevelt National Park, Elkhorn Ranch
Unit, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://nps.gov/thro/planyourvisit/elkhorn-ranch-unit
.htm [https://perma.cc/5SPY-7A2P], a fitting tribute to a great champion of public lands in America.
53. Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3237.
57. Monuments List, supra note 6.
58. The national monuments established by Roosevelt that were incorporated into national parks include: Petrified Forest and Grand Canyon in Ari-
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presidential powers under the Antiquities Act and eventually instigated litigation challenging that power.59
1. Grand Canyon National Monument
Whatever size limitations Congress may have had in mind
with the Antiquities Act were tossed aside when Roosevelt made
his revolutionary designation of Grand Canyon National Monument on January 11, 190860—a monument that encompassed almost 810,000 acres in Arizona.61
Like his first designation, the proclamation establishing the
monument was relatively brief, merely consisting of a few paragraphs in the Statutes at Large.62 In justifying the withdrawal,
the proclamation remarked that the Grand Canyon was an “object of unusual scientific interest” because it was the “greatest
eroded canyon within the United States.”63 The withdrawal prohibited utilizing the monument for any uses permitted by “public
land laws” and barred settlement within the monument’s boundaries.64 Notably, the proclamation stated the designation included the Grand Canyon as well as “such other land as is necessary for its proper protection.”65 This language suggests that
Roosevelt’s designation of lands outside the canyon was a nod to
compliance with the Act’s “smallest area compatible” requirement for protected sites.66
Notwithstanding his protection of the Grand Canyon, Roosevelt’s designation brought forth litigation challenging his authority to reserve such a large tract of land. Although there were
a number of issues in that case, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a
brief analysis, concluded the withdrawal was within the purview
of the President’s powers under the Antiquities Act.67

zona; Cinder Cone, Lassen Peak, and Pinnacles in California; and Mount Olympus in Washington. Id.
59. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the litigation sparked by the
Grand Canyon designation.
60. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908).
61. Monuments List, supra note 6.
62. Proclamation No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225.
67. See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 455–56 (1920). This case
is discussed further in Part II.
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2. Jackson Hole National Monument
Another national monument designation that spurred controversy68 was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR)
withdrawal of lands to create Jackson Hole National Monument.69 The monument, located in Wyoming, covered 221,610
acres in the Teton Country.70 The presidential proclamation was,
like its predecessors, limited in its justification for creating the
monument: in seventy-eight words, the proclamation merely recited a portion of the language from section two of the Act, declaring that the Jackson Hole country “contain[ed] historic landmarks and other objects of historic and scientific interest.”71
Although the lands that encompassed Jackson Hole National
Monument were eventually incorporated into Grand Teton National Park72—one of the most visited and popular national
parks in the country73—support for federal protection of this
land at the time of designation was fractured. Wyoming politicians in particular opposed FDR’s Jackson Hole withdrawal.74
Opposition from Wyomingites was strong enough that Congress
eventually passed one of the few restrictions on the President’s
power to withdraw lands under the Antiquities Act.75 That restriction, part of a larger bill to incorporate Jackson Hole National Monument into Grand Teton National Park, required
“[t]hat no further extension or establishment of national parks

68. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 498.
69. Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (Mar. 15, 1943).
70. Squillace, supra note 31, at 495.
71. Proclamation No. 2578, 57 Stat. 731 (Mar. 15, 1943).
72. 16 U.S.C. § 406d-1 (2012) (incorporating Jackson Hole National Monument into Grand Teton National Park).
73. In 2018, Grand Teton National Park was the eighth most visited park,
receiving nearly 3.5 million visitors. See These Are the 10 Most Popular National
Parks, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/
travel/national-parks/most-visited-parks-photos/
[https://perma.cc/Y4BE-2J9B].
74. See generally A Bill To Abolish the Jackson Hole National Monument
as Created by Presidential Proclamation Numbered 2578, Dated March 15,
1943, and to Restore the Area Embraced Within and Constituting Said Monument to Its Status as Part of the Teton National Forest: Hearings on H.R. 2241
Before the H. Comm. on the Pub. Lands, 78th Cong. (1943) (featuring Wyoming
Congressman Frank Barrett criticizing the monument).
75. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(d) (2012). The other restriction on the President’s
power to withdraw lands occurred in response to Jimmy Carter’s reservation of
millions of acres in Alaska. See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
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or monuments in Wyoming may be undertaken except by express authorization of the Congress.”76
This reassertion of Congress’s plenary power under the
Property Clause to “make all needful rules and regulations respecting . . . property belonging to the United States”77 provides
evidence for the notion that Congress is capable and willing to
cabin the President’s designation power when that body believes
the Executive Branch has misused it. It is notable, however, that
Congress, in its rejoinder to the Jackson Hole monument, did not
grant new executive powers to revoke or diminish an existing
designation. Perhaps Congress did not want to wade into a dispute that was already well worn: a 1938 opinion by then-Attorney General Homer Cummings maintained that the President
lacked the power to outright abolish a previously designated national monument.78 In addition to the legislative response it
aroused, the Jackson Hole withdrawal also prompted a lawsuit
challenging the President’s authority to designate the site.79
3. Alaskan National Monuments
Except for one day midway through his presidency, Jimmy
Carter refrained from using his authority to designate national
monuments.80 But his actions on that day, declaring a number
of new and enlarged national monuments, dramatically altered
the scope of the President’s authority under the Antiquities
Act—especially in regard to its “smallest area” requirement.81
On December 1, 1978, Carter established or enlarged seventeen
national monuments82 in Alaska covering more than fifty-six
76. An Act to Establish a New Grand Teton National Park in the State of
Wyoming, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-787, § 1, 64 Stat. 849, 849
(1950) (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 320301(d) (2012)).
77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
78. Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op.
Att’y Gen. 185, 186 (1938). Interestingly, this opinion acknowledges that Presidents had “from time to time” diminished national monuments in accordance
with the “smallest area” requirement of the Antiquities Act but nonetheless held
that any power to confine did not create a power to revoke. Id. at 188. But see
Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 12, at 633–39 (arguing the Cummings opinion was
flawed and legally incorrect).
79. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945). This case is discussed in Part II.
80. See Monuments List, supra note 6 (listing the national monuments
Carter created and their size).
81. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
82. See Monuments List, supra note 6.
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million acres.83 With the stroke of a pen, he revolutionized presidential authority pursuant to the Act much like his predecessor
Theodore Roosevelt had done seventy years before.84 By redefining the scope of a monument’s size and the objects that a monument could protect,85 Carter essentially transformed the Act into
a tool to accomplish general land and ecosystem conservation.86
Ranging in size from the 350,000-acre designation of Aniakchak
National Monument87 to the enormous 10,950,000-acre designation of Wrangell-St. Elias National Monument,88 these new national monuments in Alaska were stunning not only for their
sheer scale but also for the objects that they protected. The aims
of these designations included the preservation of various species of wildlife, such as brown bears and bald eagles on Admiralty Island in southeast Alaska,89 a unique fish species in
Kobuk Valley,90 and a major caribou herd residing north of the
Arctic Circle.91 Additionally, these monuments aimed to protect
large-scale ecosystems, such as boreal forests, riparian lands,
and tundra in the Gates of the Arctic National Monument.92
83. Squillace, supra note 31, at 502.
84. See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982) (noting that Carter’s national monument designations exceeded in scale the designations of past Presidents under the Antiquities Act); Richard M. Johannsen, Comment, Public Land Withdrawal Policy
and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 439, 455 (1981) (noting that “President Carter withdrew over four and a half times as much public land as the
total land withdrawn under the Antiquities Act by all prior Presidents in seventy-two years”); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing Roosevelt’s significant
designation of the Grand Canyon National Monument).
85. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (requiring monuments to protect “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest” in the “smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected”). The monuments that Carter created
also represented the largest land-based designations in the Antiquities Act’s
history. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 502.
86. See Johannsen, supra note 84 (“There is little doubt that President
Carter was acting outside the spirit of the Antiquities Act; the pattern of political events indicates that the President used the Act as a general conservation
measure rather than to protect particular ‘objects of historic or scientific interest’ as required by the Act.” (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012)).
87. Proclamation No. 4612, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,013, 57,013 (Dec. 1, 1978).
88. Proclamation No. 4625, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,101, 57,102 (Dec. 1, 1978).
89. See Proclamation No. 4611, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,009, 57,009 (Dec. 1, 1978).
90. See Proclamation No. 4621, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,073, 57,073 (Dec. 1, 1978)
(noting the rare presence of the Alaskan sheefish).
91. See Proclamation No. 4617, 43 Fed. Reg. 57,043, 57,043 (Dec. 1, 1978).
92. See, e.g., id.
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These designations, however, were again not without controversy. Many in Alaska vehemently opposed the new monuments, claiming that Carter’s actions constituted an encroachment by the federal government on locals’ rights.93 Tensions ran
high among Alaskans, with several members of Alaska’s congressional delegation declaring that the federal government was
at war with the state.94 In response to Carter’s actions, many
Alaskans engaged in acts of protest. Sportsmen’s groups coordinated a gathering near Denali National Monument that aimed
to violate a number of federal land regulations.95 One protestor
in Fairbanks even burned an effigy of Carter.96
Despite this opposition, Congress ultimately sanctioned
Carter’s actions in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 198097 by adding his monument designations to the National Park Service,98 National Forest System,99 and National Wildlife Refuge System.100 However,
ANILCA also codified another restriction on the President’s
power to withdraw lands for national monuments.101 The relevant language held that: “No future executive branch action
which withdraws more than five thousand acres, in the aggregate, of public lands within the State of Alaska shall be effective
except by compliance with this subsection.”102
93. See Dermont Cole, Thirty-Five Years Ago, Carter Drew Wrath of Many
Alaskans, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 30, 2013), https://www.adn.com/
commentary/article/thirty-five-years-ago-carter-drew-wrath-many-alaskans/
2013/12/01/ [https://perma.cc/U3J6-UJXX].
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371.
98. See id. § 201.
99. See id. § 503.
100. Id. § 302.
101. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text (describing the restriction on creating new national monuments in Wyoming by presidential proclamation).
102. 16 U.S.C. § 3213(a) (2012) (emphasis added). This statute goes on to
permit the President to create Alaskan withdrawals of more than five thousand
acres but holds that the “withdrawal shall not become effective until notice is
provided in the Federal Register and to both Houses of Congress. Such withdrawal shall terminate unless Congress passes a joint resolution of approval
within one year after the notice of such withdrawal has been submitted to Congress.” Id. This provision—granting Congress the ultimate authority to sanction
such a withdrawal—may constitute an unconstitutional legislative veto. Cf. INS
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Akin to the revocation of the President’s power to designate
national monuments in Wyoming, Congress limited the President’s authority under the Act to designate national monuments
in Alaska larger than five thousand acres without congressional
approval.103 This law provides another example of Congress restricting the President’s designation power while failing to address his or her authority to revoke or reduce a monument designation.
In designating the Alaskan national monuments, Carter
protected large swaths of uniquely precious wilderness, preserved these lands, and prevented their degradation by mining,
development, and other forms of landscape alteration. Yet, in doing so, Carter used the Antiquities Act to a degree which dwarfed
the monument designations of prior administrations.104 These
monuments redefined the scope of the President’s withdrawal
authority in terms of both monument size as well as the objects
of scientific or historic interest which justified protection.105 As
Part II demonstrates, federal courts would ultimately bless
Carter’s expansion of presidential authority. Those decisions,
along with precedent regarding judicial review of discretionary
executive actions discussed below, validate the notion that
courts are willing to defer (perhaps absolutely) to the President
when a statute—like the Antiquities Act in its current form—
commits a decision to his or her discretion.
C. CASE LAW ON THE SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
To understand the monumental designation power delegated to the President and how courts should review challenges
to the use of that power, it is helpful to engage in an abbreviated
overview of how courts review challenges to presidential actions
taken pursuant to executive powers. Among other cases, this
Section delves into one of the most influential cases regarding

v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–55 (1983) (ruling that a legislative veto violates
the Constitution’s Presentment Clause).
103. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 84.
105. See supra note 84.
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presidential powers—Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer106—and, in particular, focuses on Justice Jackson’s concurrence.107 This Section then discusses federal jurisprudence regarding the relationship between presidential discretion and
judicial review of challenges to the exercise of that discretion.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
In 1952, President Truman responded to a threatened nationwide strike of steelworkers by ordering the Secretary of Commerce to commandeer and operate all U.S. steel mills.108 Relying
on his powers as Commander in Chief, Truman argued his order
was necessary because a disruption in steel production threatened national security.109 In response, the owners of the affected
steel mills brought suit and requested an injunction barring the
Secretary from seizing the mills.110 These companies claimed
that Truman overstepped the powers of the presidency by unconstitutionally entering the realm of Congress’s lawmaking
power.111 In an opinion penned by Justice Black, the Court
agreed with the companies and determined that Truman exceeded his executive powers by treading upon Congress’s power
to legislate.112 According to the Court, a presidential power
“must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself,”113 and because no law or constitutionally-granted executive power authorized the President to seize the mills, Truman’s order was unconstitutional.114
In addition to Justice Black’s opinion, each member of the
majority penned a separate concurring opinion.115 Among these
was Justice Jackson’s concurrence, where he laid out his view of

106. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
107. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 582–83.
109. Id. at 583–84.
110. Id. at 583.
111. Id. at 583–84.
112. Id. at 589. In support of its decision, the Court remarked that “[t]he
Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential
or military supervision or control.” Id. at 588.
113. Id. at 585.
114. See id. at 587–89.
115. Id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring).
Unlike the other concurrences, Justice Clark only concurred in the judgment of
the Court. Id. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the three scenarios under which a President could engage in executive action and how a court should go about reviewing a challenge to such an action.116 According to the Court and scholars,
this tripartite framework has become the dominant test for evaluating a challenge to an executive action.117
Under the first scenario, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”118 According
to Justice Jackson, in situations where Congress has authorized
the President to take an action, the authorization is presumptively valid and should be given “the widest latitude of judicial
interpretation.”119 Under this prong of Justice Jackson’s threepart test, a challenge would be successful only if the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to undertake such
an action in the first place.120 Accordingly, judicial review of such
a challenge would seemingly be limited to a constitutional inquiry supported by the federal judiciary’s authority “to say what
the law is”121 and void unconstitutional actions.122
The second prong of Justice Jackson’s test applies to instances where “the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”123 Under such a scenario, the
President can only rely upon her independent executive powers
as justification for an executive action.124 However, Justice Jackson noted that there may be “a zone of twilight in which [the
President] and Congress may have concurrent authority” and in
which “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” may enable a President’s action.125

116. Id. at 635–38.
117. Laura A. Cisneros, Youngstown Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judicial Ethos and the (Un)fastidious Use of Language, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 577, 578
n.2 (2012) (summarizing the breadth of case law, statements by current Supreme Court justices, and academic literature that exalt Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence as the standard for evaluating executive actions).
118. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 637.
120. Id. at 636–37.
121. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
122. Cf. id. at 180 (“[A] law repugnant to the constitution is void.”).
123. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id.

2019]

A MONUMENTAL TASK

483

Under the third prong, the President’s power is at its “lowest
ebb” when it conflicts with “the express or implied will of Congress” because the President is only acting “upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter.”126 It is in these types of scenarios that courts
must engage in a judicial review which scrutinizes a President’s
action in order to uphold the separation of powers and preserve
the constitutional equilibrium among the three branches of the
federal government.127
2. Presidential Discretion and Judicial Review
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal
courts may hear challenges to agency actions that injure a
party.128 Per the statute, when reviewing an agency action, “the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”129 Notably, however, an organic statute precludes judicial review of
an agency action when it commits discretion to an agency in undertaking that action.130 Similarly, when Congress “commits [a]
decision to the discretion of the President,” the Supreme Court
has held that challenges to the exercise of that discretion are
outside the purview of the judiciary.131 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has also held that the President is not an agency as defined by the APA, finding that:
The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of
powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find
that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by Congress

126. Id.
127. See id. at 638.
128. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–702 (2012).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
130. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see also Consumer Fed’n of Am. v. FTC, 515 F.2d
367, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“Under the APA, judicial review of administrative
action is the rule, unless there is a statutory prohibition of judicial review or
unless agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” (citation omitted)); Sugarman v. Forbragd, 405 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1968) (“By the terms
of [the Administrative Procedure] Act, § 701(a)(2) . . . is not to apply where
‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.’”).
131. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994); see also id. at 476 (“How
the President chooses to exercise the discretion Congress has granted him is not
a matter for our review.”).
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before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.132

Taken as a whole, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence seems
to suggest that discretionary actions that the President executes
pursuant to a statute are beyond the scope of judicial review.
However, this assertion of absolute deference to the Executive
Branch is a point of disagreement among courts.133 Some courts
forbid judicial review of a discretionary presidential action.134 In
contrast, the D.C. Circuit has moved away, at least in part, from
complete deference to a President’s exercise of discretion, noting
that there are certain instances where the assumption that such
an action is non-justiciable is misguided.135 For example, in
Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, the D.C. Circuit held that the
Supreme Court’s holding in Dalton v. Specter—precluding judicial review of an executive action when Congress authorizes the
President to exercise discretion136—was limited to instances
“when a statute entrusts a discrete specific decision to the President and contains no limitations on the President’s exercise of
that authority.”137 Thus, the natural corollary to this position is
that when a statute cabins in the President’s discretion with at
least some limitations on a delegated power, courts may review

132. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
133. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322,
1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (favoring, based on the circumstances, judicial review
of the President’s discretionary decision); Utah Ass’n of Ctys. v. Bush, 316 F.
Supp. 1172, 1183 (D. Utah 2004) (“Clearly established Supreme Court precedent instructs that the Court’s judicial review in these circumstances is at best
limited to ascertaining that the President in fact invoked his powers under the
Antiquities Act. Beyond such a facial review the Court is not permitted to go.
When the President is given such a broad grant of discretion as in the Antiquities Act, the courts have no authority to determine whether the President
abused his discretion.” (citations omitted)).
134. See, e.g., Utah Ass’n of Ctys., 316 F. Supp. at 1183.
135. See Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331–32 (finding that Dalton v.
Specter’s reasoning that judicial review is barred when a statute authorizes the
President to exercise discretion is limited to instances when the statute places
“no limitations on the President’s exercise of that authority”); Roberto Iraola,
Proclamations, National Monuments, and the Scope of Judicial Review Under
the Antiquities Act of 1906, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 171
n.51 (2004).
136. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477 (“Where a statute . . . commits decisionmaking
to the discretion of the President, judicial review of the President’s decision is
not available.”).
137. Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331 (emphasis added).
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claims that allege an executive action violates those limitations.138 In essence, these courts argue for the position that absolute deference to a President’s discretionary action only occurs
when there are no discernible limitations on the exercise of discretion.139
As Part II demonstrates, all of this preceding authority is
relevant to a discussion of judicial review in Antiquities Act challenges because the statute itself entrusts the decision to designate national monuments to the President’s discretion.140 Yet
the Act also places limitations on the exercise of that discretion
by enumerating that (1) only certain objects can be predicates for
a national monument designation by the President,141 and (2)
those monuments constitute the “smallest area compatible” with
the protection of those objects.142
Additionally, as Part III highlights, Congress’s implied disagreement with a presidentially backed monument reduction or
revocation—based on a provision tucked into the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976—implicates the third prong
of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework.143

138. See id. at 1332 (concluding that there are “judicially enforceable limitations on presidential actions”).
139. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 477; Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1331.
140. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
141. The Act authorizes the President to exercise his or her discretion to protect “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects
of historic or scientific interest” that are worthy of monument status. Id. Accordingly, precedent suggests that decisions about which landmarks, structures, and objects to protect may be non-reviewable. See Dalton, 511 U.S. at
4770. But see Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v.
United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920). Although the Court in Cappaert and Cameron was incredibly deferential to the President’s decision, it implicitly adopted
the view that it could review challenges to the President’s use of discretion by
analyzing whether the monument complied with the statute, rather than wholesale deferring to the President without any review. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142;
Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56. However, it is important to note that these decisions predated Dalton v. Specter, which called for judicial deference to the President’s exercise of discretion.
142. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b).
143. See infra notes 292–94 and accompanying text.
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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL
MONUMENT DESIGNATIONS
Since Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, various Presidents have utilized the Antiquities Act to designate new monuments or expand existing ones to protect objects of historic, scientific, and cultural significance.144 But many of these
monument designations were controversial and generated legal
challenges by aggrieved parties.145 With an eye towards identifying the proper standard of judicial review for these challenges,
this Part examines the types of claims that plaintiffs commonly
make in cases predicated on alleged violations of the Antiquities
Act and how courts have addressed them. It also demonstrates
how federal courts have differed in reviewing challenges to national monument designations, which provides the impetus for
the proposed solution in Part III to bring uniformity to judicial
review in these cases.
Section A begins by applying the principles of judicial review
of presidential exercises of discretion generally to the Antiquities
Act. Sections B through D explore cases from each level of the
federal judiciary that involved challenges to national monuments arising from controversial presidential monument designations—including several of the monuments discussed in
Part I.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ANTIQUITIES ACT CHALLENGES
According to Professor Mark Squillace, a key process question in Antiquities Act cases remains unresolved.146 He notes
that courts have struggled with the proper standard of review to
employ when hearing challenges to national monument designations made pursuant to the Antiquities Act.147 Without guidance
from the statute itself148 or the Supreme Court, a clear answer

144. See, e.g., Monuments List, supra note 6.
145. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 93.
146. Mark Squillace, The Looming Battle over the Antiquities Act, HARV. L.
REV. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-looming-battle
-over-the-antiquities-act/ [https://perma.cc/V2FX-95H3].
147. See id.
148. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and
the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 37 (1982) (noting the Antiquities Act “contains no provision for judicial review”).
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to this question has eluded lower federal courts.149 This is significant because, outside of two Supreme Court cases,150 disputes
over national monument designations have occurred solely at
the circuit and district court levels.151 Consequently, enunciating
a standard of review may help to diminish the amount of litigation over national monument designations.
Further complicating this inquiry, it is unclear whether a
court even possesses the authority to review a challenged monument designation in the first place. The D.C. Circuit noted that
it has had “no occasion to decide the ultimate question of the
availability or scope of review for exceeding statutory authority”
vis-à-vis Antiquities Act cases.152 More recently, in a challenge
to Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and Seamounts
Marine National Monument, a D.C. federal district court also
declined to rule on the “availability and scope of review” for certain claims based on the Antiquities Act statutory requirements.153
As Section I.C.2 demonstrated, to address the question of
judicial review, we must answer whether the Antiquities Act
grants the President unconstrained discretion in designating national monuments, or whether there are discernible limitations
on his or her discretion under the monument-designation
power.154 Parties interested in the subject are split. In the antireview camp are those who argue that the Supreme Court has
clearly articulated that a President’s discretionary action cannot
be reviewed by the courts and thus a President’s decision to designate national monument is unreviewable.155 This was the po-

149. See Mountain States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1135 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never expressly discussed the scope of
judicial review under the Antiquities Act.”).
150. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
151. See infra Parts II.C–D.
152. See infra Parts II.C–D.
153. See Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48, 55 (D.D.C.
2018).
154. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 534–36 (describing several approaches
to reviewing presidential monument designations); Squillace, supra note 146
(describing the standard of review); see also Iraola, supra note 135, at 171 n.52
(noting the approaches courts have used to review Antiquities Act challenges).
155. Brief for Federal Defendants at 8, Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n. v. Ross,
No. 17-406 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2018) (asserting that “the President’s exercise of
discretion under the Antiquities Act is not subject to judicial review”); id. at 1
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sition taken by the federal government in its defense to the lawsuit challenging Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and
Seamounts Marine National Monument.156
In opposition to the absolute deference position are those
who claim that such unrestrained executive power only exists
when a statute places no limitations on the exercise of a President’s discretion.157 For example, one commentator argued that,
“while [the Antiquities Act] grants the President broad discretion, and separation of powers concerns are present, the statute
also contains some restrictions. Judicial review ‘is available to
ensure that the Proclamations are consistent with constitutional
principles and that the President has not exceeded his statutory
authority.’”158
Which position should win the day? Unfortunately for advocates of restraints on executive power, it seems more probable
than not that the Supreme Court would withhold judicial review
of a President’s exercise of discretion in designating a national
monument, especially in regards to the first requirement concerning objects eligible for protection.159 The language of this
statutory provision is written in broad terms: landmarks, structures, and historic or scientific interest.160 These last two terms
in particular—historic and scientific—are not amenable to
bright line determinations about what objects fall under these
categories. It seems appropriate that the President, with all the
power that comes with leading and managing the vast resources
of the U.S. government, is in a better position than the courts to
understand which objects are worthy of protection. It also bears
recognizing that the President, unlike federal judges, is directly
accountable to the will of the people by virtue of the ballot box.
Thus, he or she is undoubtedly better equipped to evaluate the
political considerations, make the political decisions, and accept

(“This Court cannot review how the President exercised the discretion that Congress granted him to designate and define national monuments in the Antiquities Act.” (citing Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994); Tulare County v. Bush,
306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002))).
156. See id.
157. See Iraola, supra note 135, at 171; supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text.
158. Iraola, supra note 135, at 171 (quoting Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
159. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
160. Id.
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the political consequences which so often arise in national monument designations.161
B. SUPREME COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES
ACT
United States Supreme Court case law involving the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act is surprisingly thin.
The Court has decided cases involving challenges to this authority only twice162 since the Act was signed into law.163 In both
cases, the Court upheld the monument designation as a valid
exercise of presidential power under the Act.164 In neither case
did the Supreme Court explicitly address the applicable standard of review.165
1. Cameron v. United States
The first case was Cameron v. United States.166 In Cameron,
the bulk of the Court’s opinion focused on evaluating the appellant’s mining claim affected by the Grand Canyon National Monument designation.167 Before it addressed this issue however, it
conducted a cursory review of the president’s authority to designate the monument in the first place.168 It disagreed with the
appellant’s argument that Theodore Roosevelt had exceeded his

161. For example, see supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text, which describes the backlash that Carter’s national monument designations in Alaska
sparked in that state’s citizens. Additionally, see Squillace, supra note 31, at
495–99, which details the controversy that followed FDR’s creation of Jackson
Hole National Monument.
162. See Iraola, supra note 135, at 172–74.
163. The Court also considered a case involving the Antiquities Act in United
States v. California, 436 U.S. 32 (1978). However, that case did not involve a
challenge to a presidential national monument designation on the grounds that
the designation exceeded the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act.
Rather, that case involved the question of who owned the submerged lands and
waters within Channel Islands National Monument—California or the United
States. Id. at 33. The court found in favor of California. Id.
164. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Cameron v. United
States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920).
165. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128; Cameron, 252 U.S. 450.
166. 252 U.S. 450.
167. Id. at 456–65.
168. Id. at 455–56.
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authority under the Act.169 For support, it cited the Act’s language regarding “objects of historic or scientific interest”170 and
then parroted the President’s assertion that the Grand Canyon
was “an object of unusual scientific interest.”171 It also briefly
described some of the Canyon’s characteristics to support its conclusion.172
As it relates to the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act, the Court’s opinion in Cameron is notably brief. It is
also notable for what it failed to explicitly discuss. The Court did
not directly address whether it possessed the authority to review
the President’s use of discretion in designating a monument.173
Nor did it touch upon the standard of review it applied to appellant’s challenge of the designation. It bears acknowledging that
by evaluating whether the Grand Canyon was an object of scientific interest, the Court implicitly assumed at least a limited authority to review whether the President’s use of discretion in designating a monument comported with the Act’s requirement that
a protected object be of “historic or scientific interest.”174 But its
analysis of this issue was shallow and merely deferred to President Roosevelt’s assertion that the Grand Canyon qualified as
the type of object contemplated by the Act.175 Thus, Cameron
represents the first example of the Court granting considerable
deference to the President’s discretion to designate a national
monument—particularly in regards to whether an object qualifies for protection.
2. Cappaert v. United States
Besides Cameron, the most consequential Supreme Court
case involving a challenge to the President’s use of the Antiquities Act occurred in Cappaert v. United States.176 The appellants
169. Id.
170. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
171. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56 (quoting Proclamation No. 794, 35
Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908)).
172. Id. at 456 (“It is the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not
in the world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as
one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands
of visitors.”).
173. Whether this issue of review was briefed or discussed at oral argument
is unclear.
174. 54 U.S.C. § 320301.
175. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455–56.
176. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
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in Cappaert challenged Truman’s addition of Devil’s Hole, “a
deep limestone cavern in Nevada,”177 to the preexisting Death
Valley National Monument.178 The crux of the case dealt with
whether the addition of Devil’s Hole to the existing national
monument reserved federal water rights in unappropriated water within the site.179 But a minor issue in the case hinged on
whether the President’s action violated the Antiquities Act. Specifically, the appellants challenged the President’s authority to
designate pools like Devil’s Hole under the Act and argued that
the designation power was limited to “archeologic sites.”180 In essence, the appellants were challenging President Truman’s discretionary determination that the monument contained “objects
of historic or scientific interest,” which came within the purview
of the statute.181
Like Cameron, the Court’s analysis of the appellant’s Antiquities Act claim was brief and relied on Cameron as justification
for rejecting the argument that the Act did not apply to sites like
Devil’s Hole.182 But, unlike Cameron, the Court did not incorporate language from the presidential proclamation to justify its
finding that the monument designation fell within the confines
of the statute.183 Instead the Court engaged in simple statutory
interpretation to conclude that “[t]he pool in Devil’s Hole and its
rare inhabitants are ‘objects of historic or scientific interest.’”184
Due to the brevity of the portion of the opinion addressing
the Antiquities Act claim, the Court failed to explicitly address
its authority to review the claim.185 But by analyzing whether
the Act was limited to protecting archaeological sites, the Court
seemingly implied at least a limited review power to determine

177. Id. at 131.
178. President Herbert Hoover first designated this monument on February
11, 1933. Proclamation No. 2028, 47 Stat. 2554 (1933). Truman enlarged it to
include Devil’s Hole in 1952. Proclamation No. 2961, 3 C.F.R § 147 (1949–1953).
179. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 131.
180. Id.
181. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (2012).
182. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142 (citing Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S.
450, 451–56 (1920)).
183. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text (summarizing the
Court’s utilization of assertions from Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 Proclamation
to justify its finding that the Grand Canyon National Monument complied with
the statute).
184. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142.
185. See id. at 141–42.
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whether a monument designation contained the sorts of protectable objects encompassed by the statute—much like it did in
Cameron.186 This further suggests that courts might have the
authority to determine whether a President’s exercise of discretion comports with the Act’s requirements, notwithstanding
other Supreme Court precedent that bars courts from reviewing
a discretionary executive action.187 However, Cameron and Cappaert may no longer be good law given that they predate that
precedent, including the Court’s 1994 decision in Dalton v. Specter, which held that courts cannot review challenges to a President’s discretionary action made pursuant to a congressional
grant of authority.188
Simply put, the question of review remains unanswered.
Even assuming that the power of federal courts encompasses the
authority to review a presidential monument designation, the
waters remain muddy because the Court has also failed to explicitly define the appropriate standard of review.189 As a result,
lower federal courts have been left without clear guidance about
which standard of review to apply.
3. Takeaways from the Supreme Court’s Antiquities Act
Jurisprudence
To summarize, the minimal Supreme Court case law dealing
with presidential power and discretion under the Antiquities Act
imparts several lessons.
First, it is unclear whether the Court would sanction judicial
review of a President’s decision to designate a national monument because the statute grants the Executive Branch discretion
in making this determination.190 On one hand, the Court’s willingness to engage in a limited review in Cameron and Cappaert
to ensure that the challenged monuments complied with the

186. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (asserting that the Court
made the same type of implicit assumption).
187. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994); United States v. George
S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940) (“[N]o question of law is raised when
the exercise of the President’s discretion is challenged.”); Dakota Cent. Tel. Co.
v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 184 (1919) (explaining that a claim is beyond the
scope of judicial power when it is premised on an abuse of discretion by the
Legislative or Executive Branch).
188. Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476.
189. See Cappaert, 252 U.S. at 141–42; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S.
450, 455–56 (1920).
190. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301 (2012).
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Act’s requirement signals it would sanction some degree of review. The fact that it ruled unanimously in both cases bolsters
this position further.191 However, critics can point to more recent
case law that forecloses judicial review of a discretionary executive action.192 Given this jurisprudence and the Court’s current
makeup, it ultimately seems more likely that the Court would
defer to the President’s discretion and foreclose judicial review
of his monument designations. But as it currently stands,
whether by the Court or Congress, further clarification of this
issue is certainly needed.
Second, even assuming that judicial review is possible, the
Court has left parties to guess what the proper standard of review is. Because of this, Part III proposes a standard of review
for the courts to apply in Antiquities Act cases.
Finally, because the Court has not had the opportunity to
hear a challenge to a designation on the grounds that it did not
comply with the Act’s “smallest area” requirement, it is unsettled whether the Act commits compliance with this limitation
solely to the President’s discretion. And, even if this requirement
does lend itself to judicially manageable standards, it is unclear
whether the Act affords a challenge based on this provision the
same standard of review that an “objects of historic or scientific
interest” claim would receive.
C. CIRCUIT COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
Both circuit court cases confronting challenges to the President’s authority to designate national monuments were decided
by the D.C. Circuit on the same day. These cases are: Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Bush193 and Tulare County v.
Bush.194
1. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush
In Mountain States, the court addressed a challenge to six
of Clinton’s national monument designations.195 The appellants
argued that the district court erred in not engaging in a more
thorough review beyond mere facial consideration of whether the
191. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128; Cameron, 252 U.S. 450. Interestingly, two
seemingly conflicting cases—Cameron and Dakota Central—were decided in the
same year.
192. See, e.g., Dalton, 511 U.S. at 476.
193. 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
194. 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
195. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1133–34.
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monument designations exceeded the President’s authority under the Antiquities Act.196 But the circuit court declined the opportunity to address “the availability or scope of judicial review
of a Presidential Proclamation designating federal lands as a national monument under the Antiquities Act.”197 It did so on the
grounds that the appellants had “failed to present any factual
allegation sufficient to warrant review of its ultra vires claim.”198
Put another way, the court held that it could not reach the question of the scope of judicial review because the appellant’s complaint did not allege facts suggesting Clinton exceeded his statutory authority. Instead, the court found the plaintiffs’
complaint only contained “legal conclusion[s] couched as factual
allegation[s].”199
Despite noting that the Supreme Court has never proclaimed the standard of review applicable to Antiquities Act
challenges,200 the court did find that “the Supreme Court has indicated generally that review is available to ensure that the
Proclamations are consistent with constitutional principles and
that the President has not exceeded his statutory authority.”201
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit carved out an exception to the general rule of deference to a President’s discretion based on separation of powers principles when an “authorizing statute or another statute places discernible limits on the President’s
discretion.”202 There, the court found that, “[j]udicial review in
such instances does not implicate separation of powers concerns
to the same degree as where the statute did not at all limit the
discretion of the President.”203
Coupled together, these two statements indicate that the
D.C. Circuit might be willing to entertain a claim that an executive monument designation exceeded the limits of the President’s authority because it violated the statute’s limitations on
his or her discretion. Here, that would mean the designation either did not (1) contain protectable objects or (2) comply with the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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“smallest area compatible” requirement.204 But in order to proceed, a party would need to include factual allegations in its complaint that satisfied the court. Given the deference courts afford
to executive actions made pursuant to a statute, this presents an
acute burden for a plaintiff to overcome.
Finally, on a related note, the Court found that the Antiquities Act did not violate the non-delegation doctrine because it included “intelligible principles to guide the President’s actions.”205
These same principles—the objects of historic/scientific interest
and “smallest area compatible” requirements—could be used to
cabin in the President’s discretion and allow for judicial review
when alleged violations occur.
2. Tulare County v. Bush
The other circuit court case implicating a question of presidential authority under the Antiquities Act was Tulare County
v. Bush.206 This case, which involved a challenge of Clinton’s designation of Grand Sequoia National Monument, had a disposition similar to Mountain States.207 Relying on the same principles it espoused in Mountain States, the court held that the
appellant failed to plead a basis for “ultra vires” review of the
Proclamation.”208 It did address several points, however, that did
not arise in Mountain States.
First, the court dismissed the appellant’s claim that the Antiquities Act requires a “certain level of detail” in presidential
monument designations.209 Second, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cappaert v. United States,210 the court found
that “ecosystems and scenic vistas” fall within the boundaries of
protectable objects under the Antiquities Act.211 This suggests a
rather broad conception of what constitutes an object of interest
under the Act.
204. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
205. Mountain States, 306 F.3d. at 1137.
206. 306 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
207. Id. at 1140.
208. Id. at 1144 (quoting Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136–37).
209. Id. at 1141.
210. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
211. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142. This also aligns with the types of objects that the President sought to protect in his monument designations. For
example, enlarging Glacier Bay National Monument protected two of “the oldest
plant communities in southeast Alaska.” Proclamation No. 4618, 43 Fed. Reg.
57,073, 57,073 (Dec. 1, 1978).
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Third, while the court dismissed the appellant’s argument
that the monument was not the smallest area compatible to protect the objects of interest, it did so on the grounds that the appellants failed to make factual allegations to support its claim—
namely that it failed to identify “the improperly designated lands
with sufficient particularity to state a claim.”212 Notably, the
court could have resolved the “smallest area compatible” claim
by rejecting the appellant’s argument that the President abused
his discretion on the grounds that the President’s application of
discretion was non-reviewable. Stated differently, the court
could have found that the Act committed the “smallest area compatible” requirement to the President’s discretion. This alternative basis could have implicated the Supreme Court’s previous
ruling that unconstrained discretion committed to the legislative
or Executive Branch is not reviewable.213 By not doing so, the
court left open the possibility that compliance with the Act’s size
requirement may be subject to judicial review.214 Finally, the
court determined that presidential actions are not subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).215 As a result, Congress should explicitly provide for a standard of judicial
review under the Antiquities Act to quell confusion among the
courts.216
D. DISTRICT COURT CASES INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
Among the suits involving challenges to national monument
designations by the President, many have been decided in federal district courts. An examination of these cases provides a
greater understanding of how courts have grappled with these
challenges and what contributions they have made to the discourse about judicial review in Antiquities Act cases.

212. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1142.
213. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994).
214. It remains an open question if that review is limited to facial considerations.
215. Tulare County, 306 F.3d at 1143 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992)); see Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800–01 (“The President is
not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but he is not explicitly included,
either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional
position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject
the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of
his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
216. See infra Part III.
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1. Wyoming v. Franke
Wyoming v. Franke217 concerned a challenge to FDR’s creation of Jackson Hole National Monument. Among other claims,
the State of Wyoming argued that the monument violated the
Antiquities Act because it did not contain “objects of an [sic] historic or scientific interest” and was “not confined to the smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of a National Monument.”218 In its defense, the federal government responded that (1) the executive action was not subject to judicial
review, and (2) that it nonetheless complied with the “scope and
purpose” of the Act.219 Notwithstanding the government’s first
assertion, the court found that it possessed “limited jurisdiction
to investigate and determine whether or not the Proclamation is
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power under the Antiquities Act so as to be outside of the scope and purpose of that Act
by which the President . . . has exceeded or violated a discretion
thereby conferred.”220
To that end, the court heard extensive evidence from both
parties on the issue of whether the withdrawn land constituting
the monument contained “historic landmarks, historic or prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.”221 After considering the evidence, the court determined that
the federal government satisfied its burden of showing that the
President’s exercise of discretion was not arbitrary and capricious.222 This was despite the court’s declaration that it would
have found that the objects requirement was not fulfilled if preponderance of the evidence was the standard of review.223 It continued by remarking that this lower burden was due to the “limited scope” that it elucidated earlier.224 In concluding its
decision, the court explained that this dispute was essentially a

217. 58 F. Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
218. Id. at 892. The state also claimed that FDR’s action was “an attempt . . . to substitute, through the Antiquities Act, a National Monument for
a National Park, the creation of which is within the sole province of the Congress, thereby becoming an evasion of the law governing the segregation of such
areas.” Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
221. Id. at 895.
222. See id. at 895–96.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 896.
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controversy between Congress and the President and it was incumbent on Congress to pass “remedial legislation” if it disagreed with how the Executive Branch was utilizing the Antiquities Act.225
Franke is significant in Antiquities Act jurisprudence for
several reasons. One, it was the first instance of a court articulating a standard of review for challenges to national monument
designations made by the President. Here, the court determined
that arbitrary and capricious review applied.226
Two, despite articulating this standard, its process of reasoning suggests that plaintiffs would find difficulty in charging
a violation of the Act. Short of turning a barren field227 into a
monument, Presidents will always win lawsuits under this
standard of review. This hands-off approach by the courts mimics (to a degree) the jurisprudence of complete deference set forth
in cases such as Dalton v. Specter228 and United States v. George
S. Bush & Co.229 But it does stop just short of that absolute rule.
Finally, and perhaps the most important takeaway, the
court noted the judicial review analysis applies equally to the
“smallest area compatible”230 requirement.231 Here, that means
courts will give near-absolute deference to presidential discretion regarding what amount of land is necessary to effectuate the
protection of landmarks, structures, and other historical or scientific objects. However, under the Franke court’s formulation,
courts would still possess a limited ability to ensure that a President was not acting arbitrarily or capriciously when demarcating a monument’s boundaries.232

225. Id.
226. Id.
227. The court here referenced “a bare stretch of sage-brush prairie in regard
to which there was no substantial evidence that it contained objects of historic
or scientific interest” as an example of a monument which would violate the
objects requirement of the Act. Id. at 895.
228. 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994).
229. 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940).
230. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
231. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896.
232. Id. at 894.
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2. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus
Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus233 involved a challenge to
Carter’s controversial Alaskan monument designations. Once
again, the District Court of Alaska, like all other courts that have
confronted Antiquities Act claims, found in favor of the federal
government.234 In finding for the defendants, the court explained
that Carter’s designations complied with the Act’s requirements
and that the text of the statute, legislative history, and the President’s evolving use of the monument designation power over the
more than seventy years since the Antiquities Act was passed
supported this conclusion.235 The court was also persuaded by
Congress’s failure to rein in the President’s expanding monument designation power in the Federal Land Management and
Policy Act of 1976, which left the President’s Antiquities Act
powers conspicuously untouched.236
Despite finding for the government, the court in Anaconda
Copper also elucidated some principles that hemmed in executive authority.237 For example, the court determined that the Act
instituted limitations on the types of objects which the President
could protect with a national monument.238 Likewise, the court
determined that the President did not possess the authority to
designate unlimited amounts of land because the Act placed limitations on his or her power through the “smallest area compatible” requirement.239 It is unclear, however, how the court conceived of meaningfully constraining a legally questionable
monument designation given its reluctance “to determine the
standard of judicial review which shall apply in many factual
determinations by the President.”240 Presumably, the amount of

233. No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *2 (D. Alaska June 26,
1980).
234. Id. at *9–10.
235. Id. at *10.
236. Id. at *6; see Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743. This bill overhauled the executive authority in the
sphere of public lands law but failed to amend the Antiquities Act.
237. 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17861, at *2.
238. See id. (“I believe that there are limits on the authority granted to the
President by Section 2 of the Act; that those limitations I think, arise by reason
of the definition of the objects which may be made or for which Proclamations
may issue to preserve and protect such objects found on government land.”).
239. Id.
240. Id. at *9.
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land necessary to effectuate the purposes of a monument protection falls with the factual determinations accorded to the President.
In the end, Anaconda Copper’s impact is similar to that of
Franke. It recognized limitations on the President’s monument
designation power, but, like Franke, its practical implications for
restraining executive overreach in violation of those limitations
are underwhelming. And, unlike Franke, the Anaconda Copper
court failed to even define the relevant standard of review.241 Ultimately, the case does little in the way of demystifying for parties how courts would review a challenge to a presidentially-designated national monument; except for demonstrating that a
court would defer heavily to the Executive Branch.
3. Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross
In Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross,242 the plaintiffs challenged Obama’s designation of Northeast Canyons and
Seamounts Marine National Monument.243 Before reaching the
merits, the court engaged in a robust discussion about the various aspects of reviewability pertinent to the case’s disposition.244
On this issue, the court began by disagreeing with the government’s assertion that presidential monument designations are
non-reviewable because “sole discretion” is entrusted to the President.245 Citing the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States
v. California, Cappaert v. United States, and Cameron v. United
States, the court explained that monument designations are generally reviewable “[b]ecause Plaintiffs’ claims assert that the
President exceeded his statutory authority under the Antiquities
Act — i.e., that the Proclamation was ultra vires.”246 The court’s
assertion thus provides ammunition for the proposition that
there is at least a baseline authority for courts to review monument challenges and that such review does not improperly intrude upon the powers of the presidency.
But the court continued on to differentiate between the
question of whether review exists and what the appropriate
241. Id.
242. 349 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2018).
243. Proclamation No. 9496, 81 Fed. Reg. 65,159 (Sept. 15, 2016). This monument lies approximately 130 miles southeast off the coast of Cape Cod. Id. at
65,161.
244. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 54–55.
245. Id. at 54.
246. Id.
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scope of review is.247 It is in this latter question which the court
confronted uncertainty. First, it noted that some inquiries can
be adjudicated on the face of the claim “resembl[ing] the sort of
statutory interpretation with which courts are familiar.”248 By
way of example, it explained that considering whether an archaeological site qualifies as an “object of historic or scientific
interest”—as the Cappaert Court did—qualified as such an inquiry.249
On the other hand, the court explained that other inquiries,
like whether an object was historic or scientific, or whether the
“smallest area compatible” requirement was satisfied, required
factual determinations which may be beyond the authority of the
court to review.250 The court specifically noted that it was questionable whether it could even engage in review of the claim that
Obama’s designation failed to comply with the Act’s mandate
that a monument “be confined to the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.”251 The court explained that its ability to review such a
claim would involve “considering the facts underlying the President’s determination” and that such an inquiry may be barred
by precedent, thus suggesting that discretionary executive actions are not reviewable.252 Moreover, the court determined that
it was unnecessary to decide whether judicial review was available for the “smallest area” requirement because the plaintiffs
had failed to offer “sufficient factual allegations to succeed” on
the merits of their claim.253 The court did find, however, that review could be possible, but “only if the plaintiff were to offer plausible and detailed factual allegations that the President acted
beyond the boundaries of authority that Congress set.”254
The primary takeaways from Massachusetts Lobstermen’s
Ass’n are twofold. One, judicial review in Antiquities Act cases is
itself available.255 But two, the scope of such review is uncertain

247. Id. at 54–55.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 54.
250. Id. at 55.
251. Id.; see 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
252. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 55; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 (1994).
253. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 55.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 54.
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for the Act’s twin requirements.256 Nevertheless, the court found
that it was unnecessary to determine the appropriate standard
of review because the plaintiffs failed to make specific factual
allegations that Northeast Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument was not confined to the smallest area possible.257
To answer the uncertainties noted in the preceding analysis
of Antiquities Act jurisprudence—namely whether judicial review is available and, if so, what the standard of review should
be—this Note now turns to Part III. Part III describes a proposed
legislative solution which clarifies the courts’ power to review
Antiquities Act challenges as well as the appropriate standard
of review—depending on the type of challenge—to apply.
III. THE SOLUTION TO A MONUMENTAL PROBLEM: A
LEGISLATIVE REMEDY
As it currently stands, there are two overarching issues in
Antiquities Act jurisprudence that remain open for debate: (1)
whether federal courts are authorized to review challenges to national monument designations made by the President pursuant
to his or her powers under the Act and, (2) assuming federal
courts do possess this authority, what is the appropriate standard of review that courts should employ.
This Part addresses these issues in order—first, by answering in the affirmative that federal courts should be definitively
authorized to review challenges to national monument designations, and second, by proposing that Congress should amend the
Act to include a standard of review which reinforces the statute’s
role as a preservation tool while still adhering to the limitations
that Congress placed on the President’s use of that power.
Finally, this Part differentiates actions taken by the President which result in the reduction or revocation of national monuments. These actions, such as those initiated by Trump,258 implicate separation of powers principles generally, and the third
prong of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework specifically.259
When reviewing challenges to monument reductions or revocations, courts should be especially skeptical of the President’s use
256. Id. at 54–55; see 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)–(b).
257. Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n, 349 F. Supp. 3d at 67–68.
258. See supra notes 11, 16–17.
259. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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of the Antiquities Act in this manner because, as we will see,
Congress has arguably signaled its disagreement with such a
practice. Accordingly, Congress should also clarify that the President may not reduce or revoke a prior national monument designation.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ANTIQUITIES ACT CHALLENGES
Although some lower courts have held that the Supreme
Court implicitly adopted the position that judicial review is
available in Antiquities Act challenges,260 the Court has never
explicitly answered this question in the affirmative. Moreover,
cases—decided subsequent to the most recent case involving the
Act—such as Dalton v. Specter have set forth the principle that
when a statute grants the President discretion, courts lack the
power to review challenges to the exercise of that discretion.261
Because the Antiquities Act undoubtedly grants the President
discretion in creating or enlarging national monuments, the
Court’s most recent precedent suggests that these decisions are
non-reviewable.262 Even taken in the light most favorable to the
pro-review camp, the answer is ambiguous at best. Therefore, it
would behoove Congress to bring clarity to this corner of the law
by enunciating that federal courts do indeed have the power to
review Antiquities Act challenges.263 Doing so would reinforce
the separation of powers by providing a check on executive authority.
To achieve this, Congress should look to the reasoning in
cases like Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush264 and
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Reich.265 In those
cases, the D.C. Circuit qualified the deference afforded to the
President by limiting Dalton to statutes that place no “discernible limits on the President’s discretion.”266 The corollary is that
if a statute does place limitations on the President’s discretion,
then a court can engage in review to ensure constitutional and
statutory provisions are met. And the Antiquities Act certainly
contains such limitations—namely the protectable objects and
260. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
261. 511 U.S. 462, 476 (1994).
262. Id.
263. The degree to which the courts should be able to review these cases is
discussed in Part III.B.
264. 306 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
265. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
266. Mountain States, 306 F.3d at 1136; see supra Part II.C.1.
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“smallest area compatible” requirements.267 Congress should
clarify that these twin requirements bestow the power of review
upon the courts.
It is also important for Congress to clarify that courts may
review Antiquities Act challenges in order to enforce the separation of powers between Congress and the President. Because
Congress delegated a portion of its plenary power under the
Property Clause268 to designate national monuments, and it did
so while also instituting restrictions on that power, allowing
courts to review challenges alleging violations of those restrictions helps to insulate Congress’s plenary authority.
B. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Answering the question of whether judicial review is available, however, only addresses a threshold matter. To truly diminish the current ambiguity, it is imperative for Congress to
also clarify the appropriate standard of review in Antiquities Act
cases. This Note proposes that Congress adopt different standards of review, as described in the following three sections, depending on the type of challenge brought.
1. Broad Categorizations
The Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n court made a helpful
distinction between the types of claims a party could bring in an
Antiquities Act lawsuit. It distinguished between claims that involve typical statutory interpretation and those that challenged
the President’s exercise of discretion.269 The former type can
most aptly be described as broad categorizations, e.g., archaeological sites, ecosystems, animal species, etc. These categorizations are tied to the first requirement of the Act that limits protectable objects to “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest.”270
Congress should amend the Antiquities Act to clarify that courts
have the power to determine whether a categorization like those
listed above comports with the protectable objects requirement.
However, courts should defer to the President’s determination
regarding whether a particular object itself falls within the taxonomy of a categorization, i.e., whether it is an archaeological
267.
268.
269.
270.

54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
54 U.S.C. § 320301(a).
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site, ecosystem, etc. Admittedly, this may be a distinction without a difference that will merely incentivize Presidents to shoehorn objects into a category which courts have already found constitutes a landmark, structure, or historic/scientific object. But
this would at least force the President to rationalize his or her
use of discretion and explain why the Antiquities Act covers the
object to be protected.
In addition to engaging in typical statutory interpretation
for these types of challenges, courts should also acknowledge and
incorporate the evolving use of the Antiquities Act by Presidents
since its passage to inform their decisions. For example, courts
should heed signs of congressional acquiescence to monuments
created by Presidents to protect objects like ecosystems. Although some courts have found objects falling within this categorization are covered by the Antiquities Act,271 to prevent backsliding, courts should appreciate the fact that Congress has
acquiesced to the evolution of the Act through legislation like
ANILCA (which codified Carter’s Alaska monument designations).272 Essentially, a reviewing court’s analysis should utilize
the framework from the second prong of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer which determined that congressional acquiescence is grounds for “independent presidential responsibility.”273 As applied, this would
call for judicial deference to the President’s determination that
a broad categorization like ecosystems or animal species qualifies for the protections a national monument affords.
2. Landmarks, Structures, and Objects of Historic or Scientific
Interest
Massachusetts Lobstermen’s Ass’n also provides a useful
framework for evaluating whether, rather than a broad categorization, a particular object in a proposed national monument
qualifies as a landmark, structure, or is of historic or scientific
interest. In this instance, that court found that it was beyond the
purview of the judiciary’s expertise to determine whether, for ex-

271. See, e.g., Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, No. A79-161, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17861 (D. Alaska June 26, 1980).
272. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371.
273. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also supra notes
123–25 and accompanying text.
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ample, an object was historic or scientific enough to justify protection via a national monument.274 This approach is sensible.
Therefore, in amending the Antiquities Act to clarify judicial review, Congress should also direct courts to afford near-absolute
deference to a President’s determination that an object is historic
or scientific enough to warrant protection. This aligns with the
purpose of the Act to preserve national treasures before they are
permanently destroyed.275 In addition, Congress should also
clarify that a good faith effort to justify protection of the object
in a presidential proclamation is sufficient to invoke deference
by the courts.
Congress should institute this standard of review because
the President is better equipped than the judiciary to gather and
evaluate the facts required to make these monument designations as well as analyze the political considerations which accompany them.276 Although some might claim that using near-absolute deference eviscerates the practicality of judicial review and
freezes in place illegitimate monuments, Congress still possesses
the authority to regulate public lands.277 Its constitutional powers would allow it to revoke a designation,278 or even defund a
monument,279 to nullify an unpopular designation.280
3. Smallest Area Compatible
Effectuating the purposes of the Antiquities Act requires
balancing the need to protect national treasures and the land
required to accomplish this task with the policy of productively
using federal lands. To help control this balance, the Act’s
“smallest area compatible” requirement281 ensures that just
enough land is withdrawn to protect landmarks, structures, or
objects of historic or scientific interest—no more, no less. In pass-

274. See Mass. Lobstermen’s Ass’n v. Ross, 349 F. Supp. 3d 48, 55 (D.D.C.
2018).
275. See supra Part I.A.3.
276. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
277. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
278. Admittedly, this has a higher bar to meet given that it would require
either the President’s approval or a successful vote to override his or her veto.
279. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (Appropriations Clause).
280. In fact, this is exactly what Congress did to express its disagreement
with FDR’s designation of Jackson Hole National Monument. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 498.
281. See 54 U.S.C. § 320301(b) (2012).
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ing the Act, Congress granted the President discretion to determine how much land was necessary to fulfill this policy of preservation. Yet there may be instances in which a President makes
a determination about the amount of lands necessary to preserve
our national treasures that conflicts with the purposes of the Act.
It is for this reason that courts should have greater authority to
review claims that the smallest area requirement was violated.
Accordingly, with regards to the “smallest area compatible” requirement, Congress should amend the Act to institute arbitrary
and capricious review for this class of claims. Following the lead
of the Franke and Mountain States courts, this standard of review would allow courts to engage in a limited review that allows
parties to plead factual allegations suggesting that the President
could have protected designated objects with a smaller footprint
(or even that the protection of objects required more lands than
were designated). Using this standard of review would balance
the need to defer to the President’s discretion while also giving
parties with legitimate grievances a chance to make their case.
Employing this standard of review would also incentivize the
President to gather facts, thoughtfully consider them, and integrate them into the process of setting the monument’s boundaries. Moreover, it would induce the President to compile a record
capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny of a monument’s size.
C. SPECIAL CASES—WHEN PRESIDENTS REDUCE OR REVOKE AN
EXISTING MONUMENT
Since passage of the Antiquities Act, several Presidents reduced the size of national monuments designated by their predecessors.282 Although many of these actions were controversial,
they went unchallenged.283 Presently, Trump’s reduction of
Grand Staircase-Escalante284 and Bears Ears285 National Monuments revitalized a thorny legal issue touching upon separation
of powers principles: whether the President acts ultra vires286
282. See Squillace, supra note 31, at 563–66 (noting the reduction of Mount
Olympus National Monument and Grand Canyon National Monuments by Presidents Woodrow Wilson and FDR, respectively).
283. See, e.g., Squillace et al., supra note 12, at 66 (noting Wilson’s reduction
of Mount Olympus National Monument went unchallenged).
284. Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017).
285. Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 2017).
286. This is a Latin phrase meaning “beyond the powers of.” It is also defined
as “unauthorized” or “beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law.” Ultra Vires, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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when he or she reduces or revokes an existing monument. Although courts have yet to rule on this question,287 they are currently considering it.288
Answering this question affirmatively would mean that the
President’s monument reduction would unconstitutionally intrude upon Congress’s plenary power under the Property
Clause.289 Indeed, scholars argue that the answer to this question is yes, grounding their analysis in a discussion of the Antiquities Act’s differing language from other contemporary laws authorizing the President to revoke or modify previous
withdrawals of federal lands.290 In other words, they believe that
a lack of explicit reduction or revocation authority in the Antiquities Act, compared to other laws with such language, is fatal
to executive assertions of that power. These scholars also argue
convincingly that language in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 barring the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking any national monument designated pursuant to the Antiquities Act was a drafting error that
was instead intended to preclude the President from taking
those actions.291
Because the power to reduce or revoke prior monument designations raises separation of powers issues, specifically exclusive legislative power under the Property Clause, Congress’s bar
against executive reductions or revocations seemingly implicates
the third prong of Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework for analyzing challenges to executive actions.292 That framework suggests that when the President takes an action “incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at
its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over

287. See Squillace et al., supra note 12, at 65 (“Importantly though, no Presidential decision to reduce the size of a national monument has ever been tested
in court, and so no court has ever ruled on the legality of such an action.”).
288. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (describing Congress’s
powers under the Property Clause).
290. See Squillace et al., supra note 12, at 58–59 (noting, for example, that
the Pickett Act of 1910 permitted the President to revoke a previous withdrawal).
291. Id. at 59–64 (referencing the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 204(j), 90 Stat. 2743).
292. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the matter.”293 Here, the President enjoys no independent executive power to designate, modify, reduce, or revoke national
monuments. He or she may only act within the bounds of Congress’s delegation of its powers to regulate federal lands. Thus,
there is a strong argument that courts should afford no deference
to monument reductions or revocations because Congress intended to prohibit the President from taking such actions under
Section 204(j) of the FLPMA.294
Admittedly, however, this language is ambiguous because it
bars the Interior Secretary, rather than the President, from revoking or reducing a monument. Therefore, this Note suggests
that Congress, concurrent with the recommended statutory
changes discussed above, should also clarify that the President
may not reduce or revoke prior national monument designations.
This could be accomplished by updating the statute containing
the bar against monument reductions or revocations295 to reflect
the following language: “The President shall not modify or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under chapter 3203 of Title 54, United States Code.” Adding in this language would support the original purpose of the Antiquities Act
to create protections for our national treasures rather than eliminating them. Moreover, it would broadly advance Congress’s
stated policy declaring that our “public lands be managed in a
manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.”296
CONCLUSION
Protecting our national treasures, whether they are manmade or natural, is vitally important, and the Antiquities Act
helps accomplish this goal by giving the President the ability to
respond quickly when these treasures are threatened. By designating more than 160 national monuments since the early 20th
century, numerous administrations have preserved our country’s beauty, historic artifacts and places, and scientific wonders
for future generations. Since the Act’s passage, Presidents from
Roosevelt to Carter to Obama have contributed to the evolution

293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 637.
Federal Land Policy and Management Act § 204(j).
43 U.S.C. § 1714(j) (2012).
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
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of presidential power under the statute by designating increasingly larger monuments that protect a wider swath of places and
things. But this evolution has been controversial and has
spurred litigation. In a number of cases, courts have wrestled
with two primary issues: whether challenges to presidential national monument designations are reviewable, and if they are,
what standard of review should be used. Because the Supreme
Court’s lack of guidance in this corner of the law has puzzled
lower courts confronting these questions, Congress should
amend the Act to affirm the judiciary’s power to review challenges of national monuments designated by the President. Congress should also clarify the standards of review of the requirements which cabin in the President’s discretion. Finally, it
should clarify that the President may not reduce or revoke an
existing national monument. Hopefully, the solutions proposed
herein will help accomplish the goals of conservation and preservation while also ensuring that the President stays within the
boundaries Congress instituted as the regulator of our shared
public lands.

